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Abstract
This article reconsiders the relationship between government debt and welfare in a
two−country overlapping−generations model with lifetime uncertainty and international
product differentiation. It has recently been proposed that a higher steady−state debt level
may be welfare−enhancing in this setting. It is pointed out that this proposition does not
adequately account for the effect of debt policy on individual agents’ intertemporal
consumption profiles. While a higher debt may indeed raise aggregate steady−state
consumption, the lifetime utility of all steady−state cohorts will actually drop, unless the
elasticity of substitution between domestic output and imports is extremely low. These
particular results illustrate a more general caveat pertaining to any normative policy analysis
in settings with overlapping generations of intertemporally optimizing agents: Attempts to
draw welfare inferences on the basis of comparisons of aggregate consumption paths can be
misleading.
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In a recent contribution to the dynamic fiscal policy literature, Ghosh (1998) uses a two-country 
two-commodity extension of the Blanchard (1985) overlapping-generations model with lifetime 
uncertainty to study the relation between government debt and steady-state welfare. The analysis 
suggests in particular that a country may raise the steady-state welfare level of its residents 
through an increase in the long-run level of government debt, provided the substitutability 
between domestic goods and imports is sufficiently low and international capital flows are 
prohibited. While the increase in the public debt partially crowds out private capital and reduces 
domestic output, the associated terms-of-trade improvement can dominate the negative 
production effect on welfare.  
The present paper points out that this proposition is based on an aggregate welfare function 
that does not adequately account for the effect of debt policy on individual agents’ 
intertemporal consumption profiles. While a higher debt may indeed raise aggregate steady-
state consumption, the lifetime utility of all steady-state cohorts will nevertheless drop in the 
absence of an intergenerational lump-sum redistribution scheme, unless extreme and 
empirically implausible values for the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported 
goods are assumed. 
The following section briefly recapitulates the analytical framework. Section 3 derives a 
representation of individual agents' welfare in the steady state. Section 4 demonstrates that 
higher long-run debt is in fact associated with lower steady-state lifetime utility under plausible 
parameter settings, and section 5 draws conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Analytic Framework 
The model distinguishes two countries (a,b) and two imperfectly substitutable tradable goods 
(1,2). Each country is completely specialized in its export good. Good 1 is produced by country 
a and serves as the numeraire. Both countries are populated by overlapping cohorts of finitely-
lived agents who face a constant instantaneous proEDELOLW\￿ RI￿ GHDWK￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ $W￿ GDWH￿ Y￿￿ WKH￿
representative member of a cohort born at date s in country a maximizes expected lifetime 
utility as of v, 
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subjective discount rate, w denotes the agent's non-human wealth consisting of capital and 
government debt, y is labour income net of lump-sum taxes, r is the rate of return to capital, and 
P is the true price index associated with felicity index q, so that Paqa=c1a￿￿F2a￿￿ZKHUH￿￿￿GHQRWHV￿




presence of a Blanchard-type reverse life insurance scheme: The agent receives a premium flow 
￿￿Z￿V￿W￿￿ZKLOH￿DOLYH￿LQ￿UHWXUQ￿IRU￿EHTXHDWKLQJ￿KLV￿WHUPLQDO￿ZHDOWK￿WR￿WKH￿LQVXUDQFH￿FRPSDQ\￿￿ 
The optimal consumption expenditure plan must obey 
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Integrating (3) and (4), optimal individual expenditure can be expressed as a linear function of 
individual wealth: 
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where h(t) denotes the present value of the individual's expected labour income net of taxes, 
which is by assumption age-independent: 
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Cohort sizes at birth are time-invariant and normalized to be ￿￿￿VR￿WKH￿WRWDO￿SRSXODWLRQ￿VL]H￿SHU￿
country at any point in time is unity. Aggregating across cohorts and using capitals to express 
the economy-wide counterparts of individual variables, country a's aggregate consumption 
expenditure dynamics are described by
1 
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where D is the level of government debt. The production technology in each country is linear-
homogeneous in domestic capital K (accumulated through investment use of domestic output) 
and labour (L=1), and takes the Cobb-Douglas form F(Ki)=Ki
￿. The aggregate capital stock in a 
evolves according to 
) ( )) ( ( ) ( t C   -   t K F = t K a a a ￿    (8) 
and ra=F'(Ka). Ghosh assumes zero government expenditure on goods, hence 
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where T(t) denotes tax revenue and - due to the normalization of cohort size - likewise the 
lump-sum tax faced by any individual agent alive in t. Since international capital flows are 
prohibited
2, trade is balanced at all times , i.e. C1b ￿&2a. 




3. Individual Welfare in the Steady State 
In a steady state, the aggregate capital stock K, aggregate consumer expenditure C and the stock 
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1 See Blanchard (1985) or Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for a detailed exposition. 
2. See Buiter (1987) for an analysis of fiscal policy under perfect international financial capital mobility in a similar 
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i.e. higher debt always crowds out domestic productive capital in the steady state.
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For the welfare analysis, Ghosh derives a steady state "indirect utility function” by using the 
steady-state solutions for the aggregate consumption quantities C1a and C2a in (2), yielding 
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Ua is in fact an index of aggregate real consumption at any point in time, yet this index is 
inappropriate for a normative welfare analysis since it does not take into account that individual 
cohorts are intertemporal utility maximizers with time-variant lifetime consumption profiles. 
The arguments of the direct utility function (1) are the individual consumption quantities c1a and 
c2a, which contrary to their macro counterparts are not time-invariant in an undisturbed steady 
state: From (4) it is evident that for an individual born at some date s in the steady state, lifetime 
consumption expenditure evolves according to  
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The allocation of expenditure across the two goods is like at the macro level governed by 
c1a ￿F2a, and thus the relevant consumption paths for the derivation of the steady-state indirect 
utility function dual to (1)-(2) are 
.  
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Using (17) with (15), (16), (2), (1) and integrating
4, the appropriate indirect utility function for a 
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steady-state welfare analysis - which is not concerned with the effects on welfare of cohorts 
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where A=ln(p+￿￿-ln(1-.￿￿!￿LV￿D￿SROLF\-invariant constant. 
A normative analysis based on the index of aggregate consumption (14) proposed by 





*<0; i.e. this index may rise even though all cohorts born in the new steady state are 
worse off than they would have been in a steady state with lower government debt. The reason 
is that (14) does not capture the effect of changes in D
* on the non-stationary steady-state time 
profile of individual consumption expenditure paths: A rise in D
* lowers K
* and net-of-tax 
labour income y
* while r
* rises, and thus consumption expenditure of each new cohort starts 
from a lower level according to (16). However, the growth rate of consumption (r
*-￿￿￿RYHU￿DQ￿
individual's lifetime rises. In short, individual consumption grows faster but from a lower base 
in a steady state with higher debt. Since new cohorts face a higher tax from birth onwards but 
accumulate government bonds only gradually with age, a higher debt is associated with 
redistribution from the young to the old. 
It is therefore possible that the aggregates C1a and C2a both rise entailing a rise in the aggregate 
consumption index Ua, while each individual cohort is actually worse off, since the effect of the 
drop in initial consumption on lifetime utility dominates the positive consumption growth 
effect. The following replication of Ghosh’s numerical simulation analysis illustrates the point.   
 
 
4. Simulation Analysis 
Following Ghosh (1998),￿ZH￿VHW￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿.a=(1-.b￿ ￿￿￿￿￿DQG￿! ￿￿ Like in Ghosh, the 
welfare analysis is restricted to a steady-state comparison and does not take account of changes 
in lifetime utility of cohorts alive during the transition process between steady states.
5 In the 
initial steady state with Da
*=Db
*=0, the two economies are symmetric mirror images. Table 1 
shows the steady-state effects of an increase in country a's long-run government debt to Da=1, 
i.e. a rise in the debt/income ratio from zero to about 75 percent.
6  
Capital stock and output drop in country a, and the terms of trade improve. Aggregate 
consumption quantities of both goods rise and hence Ghosh's aggregate consumption index 
rises, yet due to the adverse effect on intertemporal consumption profiles discussed in the 
preceding section all cohorts born in the new steady state are actually worse off than they would 
be in a steady-state with zero debt.  
                                                                                                                                                        
4 See appendix for a detailed derivation of (18). 
5 A social welfare analysis that takes the transition process into account would require the introduction of an 
intertemporal aggregate welfare function weighing the lifetime utilities of individual cohorts. See Calvo and 
Obstfeld (1988) for the time-consistent specification of social welfare functions in OLG models with lifetime 
uncertainty. 
6 Since government spending is assumed to be zero in the model for notational convenience, the policy shock takes 
the form of a free uniform distribution of perpetual bonds at one point in time across living cohorts in conjunction 




It is tempting but not admissible to argue that the aggregate consumption quantities could be 
redistributed intergenerationally in lump-sum fashion, so that individual consumption paths 
become stationary and Ua becomes the correct welfare index. However, it is evident from (4) 
that the intertemporal consumption profile of individual agents is governed by ra(Ka)-￿￿XQGHU￿
decentralized decision-making and cannot be changed without affecting the steady-state capital 
stock. Thus, in the presence of a transfer scheme that redistributes income from the old to the 
young at each point in time, the steady-state solution derived above would no longer be valid. 
Figure 1 shows the relation between ua
* and public debt for alternative values of the substitution 
SDUDPHWHU￿!￿￿$V￿WKH￿JUDSK￿LQGLFDWHV￿￿the￿SURSRVLWLRQ￿￿WKDW￿IRU￿!!￿￿￿L￿H.￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿WRWDO￿ZHOIDUH￿ULVHV￿
with rise in Da
*" (Ghosh, 1998) is not correct, given that any meaningful index of country a's 
"total welfare" in the model should be an increasing function of individual lifetime utility ua. 
2QO\￿IRU￿H[WUHPHO\￿ODUJH￿!￿YDOXHV￿￿ZKLFK￿HQWDLO￿DQ￿HODVWLFLW\￿RI￿VXEVWLWXWLRQ￿EHWZHHQ￿GRPHVWLF 
and imported goods close to zero
7 and hence an extremely strong terms-of-trade response, 
dua
*/dDa
* is locally non-negative in the quantitative model. 
 
 
Table 1: Steady-State Effects of an Increase in Country A’s Government Debt 
 
Variable  Description  Da
* = 0  Da
* = 1  % Change 
Ka
*  Capital stock  4.050  3.821  -5.7 
ra*  Return to capital  0.065  0.068  +4.7 
￿
*  Inverse terms of trade  1.000  0.897  -10.3 
C1a
*  Aggregate consumption of good 1   0.708  0.729  +3.0 
C2a
*  Aggregate consumption of good 2  0.6158  0.6455  +4.8 
qa
*(s,s)  Initial consumption of new cohort  0.466  0.440  -5.6 
F(Ka
*)  Aggregate output  1.323  1.308  -1.2 
ya
*  Individual labour income net of tax  1.058  0.978  -7.6 
Ua   Index of aggregate consumption  -0.399  -0.362  +9.4 
ua  Individual lifetime utility  -6.114  -6.372  -4.2 
 
 
One further observation on Ghosh's original numerical analysis may be noted en passant. For the 
FDVH￿! ￿￿FRQVLGHUHG￿LQ￿7DEOH￿￿ above, the author suggests that the Ua
*-maximizing debt level is 
around 24.33. However, no feasible steady-state exists for a debt level of this size, even though 
the macro equations (7)-(10) would seem to allow the computation of non-negative long-run 
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solutions for all macro aggregates. Yet for Da=24.33, the tax T=raDa would exceed gross labour 
income Fa-raKa so that net labour income ya
* and human wealth ha
* would be negative for all 
agents. Since agents are born with zero financial wealth, they would already be insolvent at 
birth. In order to maintain consistency with the micro structure of the model, a non-negativity 





































5. Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis has re-examined the steady-state relationship between government debt and 
welfare in a two-country overlapping-generations model with lifetime uncertainty and 
international product differentiation. It has recently been proposed that a higher steady-state 
debt level may be welfare-enhancing in this setting. It is pointed out that this proposition does 
not adequately account for the adverse effect of debt policy on individual agents’ 
intertemporal consumption profiles. While a higher debt may indeed raise aggregate real 
consumption at each point in time, each cohort consumes less when young and more when 
old, and the lifetime utility of all steady-state cohorts will actually drop, unless the elasticity 
of substitution between domestic output and imports is extremely low. 
These particular results indicate and illustrate a more general caveat pertaining to normative 
policy analyses in any setting with overlapping generations of intertemporally optimizing 
agents: Attempts to draw welfare inferences on the basis of comparisons of aggregate 




Appendix: Derivation of Equation (18) 
 
Using (17) in the CES felicity index (2), we have 
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Using this result in (1), the expected lifetime utility of an agent born at any date s in the steady 
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We know from (15) that 
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Thus the integral term in (A-2) takes the form  
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The integral on the RHS of  (A-￿￿￿FDQ￿EH￿VROYHG￿YLD￿LQWHJUDWLRQ￿E\￿SDUWV￿DQG￿LV￿HTXDO￿WR￿￿￿￿￿￿
-2. 
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